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Highlights
• The empirical literature indicates that, in Phases I and II, the impact 
of the EU ETS on low-carbon innovation was moderate. The findings 
of one prominent study, which measures innovation output by patent 
counts, present a more clearly positive picture.
• The empirical literature indicates that, in Phases I and II, low-carbon 
investments brought about by the EU ETS were typically small-scale, 
with short amortisation times (e.g., three to five years), producing 
incremental emission reductions.
• In view of the EU’s long-term emission reduction targets, there is 
scope to improve the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS by strengthen-
ing incentives for low-carbon innovation and investment. Tightening 
the cap and extending allowance auctioning in a predictable way are 
the most frequent recommendations in the literature. 
• There is a compelling economic case, related to innovation spillo-
vers, scale and network economies, competitiveness preservation and 
energy security, for complementing the EU ETS with stronger R&D 
policies.
• The Innovation Fund – the future EU ETS funding programme for 
low-carbon innovation – will build on the experiences gained through 
the existing NER 300 programme in several important respects.
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1. Introduction
Since 2005, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) has been the main instrument adopted by the 
EU for decarbonising its economy and, globally-
speaking, the largest cap-and-trade scheme.  e 
EU ETS imposes a cap on total emissions of carbon 
dioxide, nitrous oxide and per uorocarbons from 
more than 11,000 heavy energy-using and power-
generating installations and airlines, covering about 
45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
As of Phase III (2013-2020), the EU ETS cap declines 
linearly over time, reaching in 2020 a level that is 
21% below that of regulated emissions in 2005.1 
According to the revision for Phase IV (2021-2030) 
proposed by the European Commission (EC), the 
cap will then decline more rapidly, reaching in 2030 a 
level that is 43% below that of 2005 emissions (COM 
(2015) 337).  e EU is also committed to reducing its 
overall GHG emissions by at least 80% by 2050. Cru-
cially, continued progress in the invention, adoption 
and di usion of low-carbon production processes 
and products will be necessary for meeting said tar-
gets and for minimising related costs. Following the 
economic crisis, however, the persistent imbalance 
between the supply and demand for allowances, and 
the corresponding impact on the carbon price signal, 
have led to concerns as to whether existing incen-
tives are su  cient for spurring the necessary levels 
of innovation and di usion of low-carbon tech-
nologies. Steps have been taken for addressing the 
surplus of allowances through the ‘backloading’ of 
900 million allowances and, in a structural way, with 
the establishment of the Market Stability Reserve 
(MSR).2 Additional measures for supporting low-
1.  The cap declines each year by 1.74% compared to 2010, the mid-point of Phase II (2008-2012).
2.  The MSR (Decision (EU) 2015/1814) is a rule-based mechanism that limits the excess supply of emission allowances. The 
MSR will start operating in January 2019.
3.  The workshop’s programme and contents are available on the project’s website.
carbon innovation and investment are foreseen in 
the proposed revision for Phase IV. 
 is policy brief draws on the assessment of the EU 
ETS that the Florence School of Regulation Climate 
(FSR Climate) is carrying out and on a related work-
shop on low-carbon innovation and investment. 
Both the assessment and the workshop are part of 
the LIFE SIDE project (www.lifesideproject.eu).3 
 e brief is organised as follows. Section 2 recalls the 
concepts of static and dynamic e  ciency with refer-
ence to the EU ETS. Section 3 summarises the evi-
dence for the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon 
innovation and investment. Section 4 illustrates the 
EU ETS funding programmes for low-carbon inno-
vation. Section 5 reports some points made in the 
workshop. Section 6 concludes the policy brief.
2. Static vs Dynamic E  ciency
 ere is a fundamental short-run/long-run distinc-
tion when assessing the e  ciency (i.e., the cost e ec-
tiveness) of policies for climate change mitigation. In 
the short-run, cost minimisation depends on agents’ 
operational decisions, which are conditional on 
existing capital and technology. In the long-run, cost 
minimisation also depends on investment decisions, 
which determine capital and technology through 
time. Accordingly, the EU ETS can be assessed both 
with respect to its static (short-run) e  ciency and 
with respect to its dynamic (long-run) e  ciency.
In principle, cap-and-trade systems such as the EU 
ETS are static-e  cient by nature: emissions are cut 
at the least total cost, as the market mechanism 
equalises marginal abatement costs across regulated 
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entities.4 By contrast, establishing whether the EU 
ETS is dynamic-e  cient, that is, whether it induces 
investments that allow minimising abatement costs 
over the long term, is more complicated. Operators’ 
expectations on investment returns, and thus their 
investment decisions, are a ected by uncertainties 
intrinsic to the EU ETS concerning future carbon 
prices and possible regulatory changes, as well as 
by a multitude of other market and policy factors. 
Moreover, while in principle the EU ETS is static-
e  cient, independent of the way the allowances are 
distributed,5 the same is not true for its dynamic 
e  ciency.  is is because whether allowances are 
received for free or not may change – ex-ante – the 
relative convenience of alternative investments and, 
therefore, determine di erent investment deci-
sions. As pointed out by one of the participants in 
the workshop (Section 5), and as con rmed by some 
empirical  ndings (Section 3), free allocation is one 
element of the EU ETS that can a ect its dynamic 
e  ciency.
3.  e Empirical Evidence
 ere are a signi cant, though not a huge number 
of empirical studies on the impact of the EU ETS 
on low-carbon innovation and investment. Taken 
together, they hardly o er an exhaustive supply 
of evidence and, in relative terms, are fewer than 
those looking at other aspects of the EU ETS, such 
as competitiveness e ects. Moreover, the empirical 
evidence is, as yet, limited to Phases I (2005-2007) 
and II (2008-2012).  is means, crucially, that any 
potentially relevant e ects of regulatory changes 
introduced with Phase III, notably the replacement 
of grandfathering with auctioning as the default 
4. According to the independence property, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system is cost-effective and indepen-
dent of the initial allowance allocation. A number of factors, however, can lead to the independence property being violated, 
including transaction costs, market power and price uncertainty (Hahn and Stavins, 2011).
5.  Operational decisions are independent of the way allowances are acquired. In either case, using allowances for compliance 
entails a cost: a real cost, with auctioning; an opportunity cost, with free allocation. 
6.  The full list of studies will be available in the assessment report produced by the LIFE SIDE project. 
allocation method (for the power sector) and the use 
of e  ciency benchmarks for the remaining free allo-
cation, are not yet quanti ed.
Our review identi ed 22 articles, here divided into 
two categories: those using econometric techniques 
(seven) and the others (  een), which are largely 
qualitative and descriptive analyses.6 Econometric 
analyses in this domain are limited by the paucity 
of suitable databases. Non-econometric studies draw 
on more limited information, o en derived by the 
authors through ad-hoc interviews.  ere follows a 
summary of the main evidence emerging from the 
two literature subsets. 
3.1 Econometric Literature
Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) estimate the impact 
of the EU ETS on low-carbon patenting. It is a 
study that stands out in this literature for four rea-
sons. First, patent counts are an objective measure 
of innovation; albeit only a proxy for the number of 
innovations translating into new production pro-
cesses or products. Second, the  rms in the sample 
operate over 80% of all EU ETS installations.  ird, 
the approach used (di erence-in-di erences) o ers 
a clear-cut causal interpretation of the estimated 
e ect. Fourth, the main result for the magnitude 
of low-carbon innovation brought about by the EU 
ETS is signi cantly more positive than most other 
studies would suggest.  e authors  nd that the EU 
ETS caused a 36% increase, over 2005-2009, in the 
number of low-carbon patents granted to regulated 
 rms. Other relevant results from the study are that: 
a) no evidence of an indirect innovation e ect on 
non-regulated entities is found; and b) that the surge 
in the total number of low-carbon patents observed 
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over the period in question was primarily driven by 
rising energy prices.
Martin et al. (2013) is a second important econo-
metric study investigating the determinants of low-
carbon innovation, here measured by any R&D 
activity aimed at curbing emissions or energy con-
sumption or at developing products that can help 
customers to reduce their emissions. It uses primary 
data from interviews conducted in 2009 with the 
managers of 770 manufacturing  rms in six Euro-
pean countries.  e study  nds several interesting 
results. First, the responses indicate that most  rms 
are engaged in climate-related innovation (and 
that this e ort was focused on process rather than 
product innovation). But they also show that no sta-
tistically signi cant di erence was found between 
 rms regulated by the EU ETS and non-regulated 
ones. Second, signi cant di erences in the pro-
pensity to innovate were found across sectors and 
countries.  ird, low-carbon innovation is positively 
associated with  rms’ expectations on the stringency 
of their future allocation. Fourth,  rms positioned 
just below the established thresholds for receiving 
free allowances in (subsequent) Phase III7 engaged 
more strongly in low-carbon innovation.  is last 
result is presented as evidence of a causal negative 
e ect of free allocation on low-carbon innovation.
Schmidt et al. (2012) analyse the e ects of the EU 
ETS and long-term emission reduction targets, as 
they are perceived (as opposed to what they are by 
some objective metrics), on investments in tech-
nology adoption and on R&D.  e study is based on 
interviews with the managers of 65  rms producing 
electricity and 136  rms providing technology for 
electricity generation, in seven European coun-
tries.  e e ects are measured by the respondents’ 
answers to the questions about the change and direc-
tion of innovation investments between the periods 
7.  Such thresholds are based on sectoral trade and carbon intensities.
8.  A legitimate hypothesis for this discrepancy is that a signiﬁ cant share of patented innovations had not (perhaps, not yet) 
translated into new operating production processes or commercialised products.
2005-2009 and 2000-2004. Among other results, the 
authors  nd evidence that not only did the grand-
fathering of emission allowances in Phases I and II 
hamper low-carbon technology adoption. It also 
e ectively incentivised the adoption of emitting 
technologies. Long-term emission reduction targets, 
nonetheless, are an important R&D trigger. 
While, to some extent, results vary across sectors 
and countries, some robust evidence emerges from 
the econometric literature, which includes the three 
studies outlined above and only a few more (namely, 
Lofgren et al., 2014; Bel and Joseph, 2015; Borghesi 
et al. 2015; and Lundgren et al., 2015). Most o en, 
the role of the EU ETS in driving low-carbon inno-
vation is judged to have been limited, especially 
when compared to that of energy prices. In Phases 
I and II, the EU ETS appears to have fostered incre-
mental emission reductions, above all, through fuel 
switching and small-scale investments of regulated 
 rms in energy e  ciency. Seemingly discordant are 
the  ndings of Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016), 
which show the innovation e ect as measured by 
patenting to have been substantial.8 In general, there 
is a consensus that the surplus of allowances in the 
carbon market and the corresponding impact on the 
carbon price negatively a ected low-carbon innova-
tion and investment. Grandfathering – a feature of 
the EU ETS in Phases I and II – is also identi ed as 
having been a major factor limiting the ability of the 
EU ETS to incentivise low-carbon innovation and its 
uptake.
3.2 Non-econometric Literature
Most of the studies on the impact of the EU ETS on 
low-carbon innovation and investment o er qualita-
tive or descriptive analyses. We found   een such 
studies, most of which (twelve) are based on primary 
information collected through ad-hoc interviews, 
typically with managers of regulated  rms.  ese 
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studies tend to be country and sector speci c, with 
 ve focused on the electricity sector and  ve on the 
paper sector (one on chemicals and four covering 
multiple sectors). Some are su  ciently narrow in 
scope to qualify as case studies.
Among the insights o ered by these studies, those 
concerning the incentives for low-carbon innova-
tion and investment are most relevant.  e electricity 
sector is of special interest here. First, the electricity 
sector is expected to be fully decarbonised before 
the others. Second, the electricity sector under-
went a fundamental change in regulatory regime 
in passing, with Phase III, from grandfathering to 
full auctioning. In the  rst two trading phases, per-
verse incentives created by the new-entrant and clo-
sure provisions on the allocation and withdrawal of 
allowances, respectively for new and closing installa-
tions, are frequently stressed. Allowances granted to 
new installations e ectively improved the economic 
attractiveness of investments in CO2-intensive gen-
eration. Closure provisions, whereby operators for-
feit the allowances allocated to the installations they 
close, e ectively incentivised the protracted opera-
tion of high emitting installations.  ese unintended 
incentives vanished with Phase III, as electricity 
producers ceased to receive free allowances. In fact, 
even before the start of Phase III, there is evidence 
(based on interviews with stakeholders) that the 
expectation of auctioning caused the cancellation of 
planned investments in coal power plants.  e same 
literature documents the increased interest in R&D 
activities related to Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS), which did not, however, last long due to high 
costs when compared to the level of carbon prices 
9.  For a discussion of the rationale for and recommendable features of public support for low-carbon innovation, see Mazzu-
cato and Semieniuk (2017) and Nemet et al. (2016).  
10.  NER300 is established by Art.10a(8) of the EU ETS Directive. The rules of the funding scheme are speciﬁ ed in Commis-
sion Decision 2010/670/EU.
11.  The New Entrants Reserve is an EU-wide pool of emission allowances set aside for new and expanding installations eligible 
for free allocation. 
12. The impact assessment accompanying the proposed revision for Phase IV (SWD (2015) 136) provides a detailed account of 
NER 300 and useful information on the future Innovation Fund. 
(limiting the economic viability of such investments) 
and issues of local social acceptance.
Further insights speci cally o ered by the non-
econometric literature concern organisational inno-
vation. Following Rogge (2016), organisational inno-
vations can be classi ed by whether they relate to: 
 rms’ business practices (e.g., implementing moni-
toring, veri cation and reporting of emissions, or 
participating in carbon trading); workplace organi-
sation (e.g., making the EU ETS a top management 
issue); or external relations (e.g., collaboration with 
other  rms or public institutions).  e EU ETS has 
been generally successful in these respects.
4.  e EU ETS Funding Programmes for 
Low-Carbon Innovation
Irrespective of its level, the role of carbon pricing 
in spurring low-carbon innovation is not exhaus-
tive. Above all, since innovative projects are risky by 
nature, they require speci c forms of  nancing.9 NER 
300 is the EU ETS funding programme for highly 
innovative low-carbon projects in the pre-commer-
cial demonstration phase.10  e sale of 300 million 
emission allowances in the New Entrants Reserve 
of the EU ETS11 generated €2.1 billion, which were 
awarded in two rounds (in December 2012 and 
July 2014) to one CCS project and to 38 renewable 
energy projects. As only three of the 39 projects 
have so far entered into operation, it is too early to 
draw de nitive conclusions on the programme’s per-
formance. Nevertheless, some lessons have already 
been learnt12.  ere are three critical points in NER 
300 limiting its e ectiveness. First, as a rule, funds 
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are given out upon a project’s success.13 While this 
responds to the intent of guaranteeing good use of 
public money, risk-free innovation funding clashes 
with the nature of innovative projects, which are risky 
at least to some degree. Second, funds can only cover 
up to 50% of the project’s additional cost of innova-
tion.  is condition is to make  rms leverage addi-
tional funding from other sources. But the project 
promoter may struggle to secure the extra  nancing. 
 ird, available funding may be insu  cient for the 
more expensive projects involving breakthrough 
technologies such as CCS.14
 e proposed revision for Phase IV introduces the 
Innovation Fund (IF), which will be an enhanced 
version of NER 300. At present, only a few basic fea-
tures of IF are de ned.  e scope of the programme 
will be wider compared to that of NER 300, both in 
terms of the resources made available and in terms 
of the range of eligible bene ciaries.  e  nancial 
resources will be generated by the sale of up to 450 
million allowances and projects speci c to industrial 
sectors will be funded, too.  e maximum funding 
rate will be raised to at least 60% and fund disburse-
ment is to be partially based on the achievement 
of milestones in the project’s development. Based 
on recent consultations that the EC has conducted 
with the stakeholders15, it seems likely that further 
changes will be adopted. While the IF will still use 
grants, these may be accompanied by other ways of 
 nancing eligible projects. Some diversi cation in 
 nancial instruments, including loans, guarantees 
or equity, may be tailored to projects with di erent 
risk pro les.  is would result in more  nancial 
resources being leveraged. Furthermore, concerning 
the selection of the projects, their ranking may not 
13.  Up to 60% of the funding awarded can be provided upfront, but conditionally on a MS providing an appropriate guarantee.
14.  The funding awarded to the one CCS project (€300 million) only covers 34% of its additional costs.
15.  The results of a series of workshops instrumental in the design of the IF are summarised in Climate Strategy (2017).  
16.  Under NER 300, projects were ranked by their cost-per-unit performance, the performance being the amount of renewable 
energy produced or the amount of CO2 stored in the case of CCS projects. 
17.  The workshop was held under Chatham House rules and, therefore, no names can be revealed in this section.
be exclusively based on individual ‘value for money’ 
in terms of emissions abatement.16  ey may also 
consider the potential for wider bene ts emerging 
from cross-sector cooperation. 
5. Insights from the Workshop
 e LIFE SIDE workshop on low-carbon innova-
tion and investment in the EU ETS brought together 
about 25 experts.  ese included analysts from 
universities and other research institutions, policy-
makers and representatives of regulated industries 
and of NGOs. A selection of the relevant points that 
were made on that occasion is reported below.17 
•  ere is a compelling economic case, related to 
innovation spillovers, scale and network econo-
mies, competitiveness preservation and energy 
security, for complementing the EU ETS with 
stronger R&D policies.
• In the EU, spending on direct support for renew-
able energy sources at the deployment level has so 
far dwarfed R&D support.
•  Contrary to previous years,  gures on European 
patents for 2014 and 2015 show a reduction in the 
share of new low-carbon patents as part of total 
new patents awarded.  is is a reason for con-
cern. A period of lower fossil fuel prices as well as 
the surplus of allowances and the corresponding 
impact on carbon prices in the EU ETS appear to 
be contributing to reduced incentives for clean 
innovation in Europe.
• Free allocation that is not technology neutral, 
as with grandfathering (but, in theory, with the 
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current benchmarking system too18) may a ect 
investment decisions.  is is because it may alter 
the economic ranking of possible alternative 
investments.19 
• EU ETS auction revenues collected by MS can be 
used for supporting low-carbon innovation (or 
for other climate-related purposes).  eir formal 
earmarking, however, is not straightforward. Even 
among economists, the earmarking of  scal reve-
nues is a disputed issue, given the potential oppor-
tunity cost for the government in committing 
money to a certain use. According to a survey-
based study carried out under the LIFE MaxiM-
iser project (www.maximiser.eu), in 2015 MS used 
on average 85% of their EU ETS auction revenues 
(slightly smaller shares in 2014 and 2013) to tackle 
climate change. However, the responses provided 
by MS did not specify whether these resources 
were used to  nance climate-related programmes 
beyond those already in place.
• Decarbonisation will require new collaboration 
models between industrial sectors. In some cases, 
the cost of decarbonisation through enhanced 
‘industrial symbiosis’ may be relatively small. For 
example, convenient opportunities for the decar-
bonisation of the iron and steel sector could arise 
from the better alignment of incentives with the 
construction sector, as happened with the auto-
mobile industry following the imposition of fuel 
e  ciency standards. In general, however, deep 
decarbonisation through industrial symbiosis, 
including progress towards a circular economy, 
requires massive levels of investment.
18.  For example, the benchmark values for ‘Bottles and jars of colourless glass’ and for ‘Bottles and jars of coloured glass’ are 
0.382 and 0.306 (allowances/tonne of output), respectively.
19.  Retrospectively, the switch from grandfathering to auctioning for the electricity sector seems to provide an example in 
point: a few studies (e.g., Rogge and Hoffmann, 2010; Pahle, 2010) document that investment plans in new coal power plants 
were cancelled when it became clear that grandfathering (more favourable to CO2-intensive plants in terms of allowances 
per KWh generated) would cease as of Phase III.
20.  The details of this proposal are in Neuhoff et al. (2016).
• As the carbon price signal is, to varying degrees, 
muted along the value chains, introducing a con-
sumption charge (of a special kind) on carbon-
intensive materials was proposed as a way to 
reinstate the signal and, thus, the incentives for 
abatement.20 
6. Conclusions
 e success of the EU ETS is vital for the full decar-
bonisation of the European economy. Continued 
progress in low-carbon innovation and investment 
on the part of  rms regulated by the EU ETS is nec-
essary both for meeting the EU’s long-term mitiga-
tion targets and for minimising related costs. 
 e existing empirical literature on the e ects of the 
EU ETS on low-carbon innovation and investment 
only concerns Phases I and II.  us, potentially rel-
evant e ects of regulatory changes introduced with 
Phase III are not yet appreciated. A recurring indica-
tion is that, in the  rst two trading phases, the impact 
of the EU ETS on low-carbon innovation has been 
moderate. However, the  ndings of one prominent 
econometric study (Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016), 
which measures innovation output by patent counts, 
present a more positive picture here.  e literature 
also indicates that low-carbon innovation e orts 
have focused on production processes more than on 
products, and that heterogeneity in the propensity to 
innovate is signi cant across sectors and countries. 
As regards the di usion of low-carbon technologies, 
investments induced by the EU ETS are typically 
described as small-scale with short amortization 
times (e.g., three to  ve years), resulting in incre-
mental emission reductions.
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 e level of ambition of the EU ETS as re ected in 
the level of carbon prices (both present and future) 
is the main parameter determining the strength of 
the incentives for low-carbon innovation and invest-
ment. Regulatory uncertainty is a variable of primary 
importance a ecting  rms’ investment decisions and 
free allocation plays a role too. Accordingly, tight-
ening the cap and extending allowance auctioning in 
a predictable normative context are the most frequent 
recommendations for strengthening incentives. It is 
equally clear, however, that the e ectiveness of such 
measures depends on multiple exogenous factors 
(Elkerbout and Egenhofer, 2017) and that additional 
complementary policies are necessary. In the  rst 
place, greater  nancial support is needed both for 
R&D activities and highly innovative projects that 
have not yet reached commercialization.  e estab-
lishment of the MSR and the proposed revision for 
Phase IV demonstrate that the policymaker, while 
subject to multiple constraints (not least that of pre-
serving the competitiveness of European industry), 
recognised these points.
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